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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that the United States Patent and Trademark Office has just granted you 
a patent for a new method of baking chocolate chip cookies. In your patent, you 
claimed a special four-step process that, if followed, creates the most delicious 
cookies ever baked. While celebrating with friends, you decide to have chocolate 
chip cookies for dessert and notice that the cookies seem strangely familiar. The 
chips are placed in the cookies in the same way as your recipe dictates. They are 
even the same shape as your custom-made chocolate chips. You are convinced that 
the cookies could only have been created using your process. 
Outraged, you confront the restaurant owner and tell him about your patented 
process. He says he feels sorry for you, but that he cannot be held liable as an 
infringer. The owner explains that even though his kitchen performs the last step of 
your process, the first three steps are performed by his pre-made cookie dough 
supplier, Pillzbury.1 Under the single-entity rule and the doctrine of joint 
infringement, the restaurant owner would not be liable for patent infringement, and 
your patent would seem much less valuable than it did only hours ago. If you had 
patented your new cookie process as a product, or maybe patented a system of 
devices that work together to create your cookies, the restaurant owner would be 
liable for infringement. Thus, you would be entitled to injunctive relief, and would 
be well on your way to building your cookie empire. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reheard two cases en banc 
with the purpose of addressing the joint infringement problem described above 
(though the patents at issue dealt with interactive websites and not with chocolate 
                                                           
 1 Not to be confused with Pillsbury, the General Mills brand responsible for the 
manufacture of delicious pre-made cookie dough that—as far as the author knows—is not 
infringing on any fictitious cookie-baking patents. 
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chip cookies).2 Unfortunately, this issue was only partially resolved.3 Instead of 
confronting the issue of joint infringement, a new rule was created that is contrary to 
precedent and the statutory framework for patent infringement.4 The disparate 
treatment of patented processes and products was also continued. In this en banc 
rehearing (Akamai II), the Federal Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify how the 
doctrines of direct and indirect patent infringement apply when the actions of 
multiple parties combine to perform a patented process. This area of patent 
infringement law has been going through convulsions for the past six years and 
needs to be addressed.5 Clarity and stability would improve the climate for 
innovation in the marketplace,6 which is the underlying purpose of patent law.7 
To resolve the joint infringement problem, this Note proposes that the party who 
performs the last step of a patented process should be liable for direct infringement. 
Under this “Last Step Rule,” patented products and processes would be treated 
similarly—which is consistent with past decisions and is implied in the patent 
statute. As will be shown in this Note, adopting the Last Step Rule would make 
finding indirect patent infringement more straightforward and would limit the 
doctrine of joint infringement to claims for direct infringement. The proposed rule 
will be shown to be logically sound, supported by case law precedent, and consistent 
with the language and framework of the patent infringement statute. 
In Part II of this Note, the nature of patents and patent infringement are described 
to lay the foundation for later discussion. Judicially created doctrines are also set out 
in Part II so that problems with the current state of the doctrine of joint infringement 
are more apparent when explained in Part III. Part IV presents solutions to these 
problems that have been proposed by other commentators and judges. Part V details 
the effects, benefits, and foundation of the proposed Last Step Rule. To illustrate its 
application, the Last Step Rule is then applied to the cases at issue in Akamai II. 
                                                           
 2 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (describing the patents at issue owned by Akamai and McKesson). 
Both of the reheard cases were previously decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 
12, 2011). 
 3 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("It is apparent that this 
jurisprudence is in need of correction, clarification, and consistency, for neither the single-
entity rule nor the majority's newly minted inducement-only rule is in accord with the 
infringement statute, or with any reasonable infringement policy.”). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint 
Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 67 (2012) (“In the last five years, the Federal Circuit has 
struggled with the doctrine of joint infringement.”). As Akamai II failed to resolve the joint 
infringement problem, it persists to this day. 
 6 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[S]tability and clarity of the law 
are essential to innovative commerce.”). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
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Possible effects of the rule and issues that it would not resolve are considered before 
closing with a proposed approach for implementation of the Last Step Rule. 
II. PATENTS AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
This Section will first explain what patents are and why they are granted, 
including the important role they play in our national economy. Subsequently, patent 
infringement doctrines—both statutory and judicially created—will be presented to 
set the stage for further discussion. 
A. What Are Patents? Why Are They Granted? 
A patent is a limited monopoly granted by the federal government to an inventor 
with the purpose of both incentivizing technological innovation and encouraging 
public disclosure of useful inventions.8 Giles S. Rich, writing shortly after the 
passage of the Patent Act of 1952 (which he helped draft)9 explained that the 
necessity of this incentive is rooted in human nature: 
The patent law is an incentive system. The incentives needed to make 
normally slothful, normally selfish human beings produce inventions, 
disclose them to the public, and supply the necessary capital to perfect 
them and get them on the market must be powerful. However much we 
may try to elevate human nature it still seems to be generally accepted 
that self-interest is a powerful force.10 
An inventor has a natural right to exploit his or her invention.11 Patents are only 
issued by the government to give the inventor a right to exclude others from 
practicing that invention.12 Holding a patent, therefore, does not give rise to a duty to 
practice the invention13 even though the purpose of the patent is to incentivize 
innovation.14 
After the patent term expires, the inventor loses his or her exclusionary right and 
others are allowed to practice the patent without restraint.15 The monopoly granted to 
                                                           
 8 See ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS 4-5 (2007) [hereinafter HARMON ON 
PATENTS]. The importance of patent law can also be shown by how the newly created Federal 
government addressed it soon after the creation of the United States. The first Congress 
quickly moved to exercise the power granted to it by the Constitution, passing the first patent 
act in its second session. Id. at 6 (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832)). 
 9 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 10 Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1953). 
 11 ROBERT L. HARMON, CINDY HOMAN & CHARLIE MCMAHON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT 4 (10th ed. 2011) [hereinafter PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT] (noting that the 
right is also subject to the patents of others, and government grants). 
 12 Id. at 4-5. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Rich, supra note 10, at 523. 
 15 PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 13 (“Once the patent expires and 
the inventor's exclusive rights terminate, others may enter the market with products based on 
the teachings of the patent.”). 
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the patentee serves to reward the inventor for his or her hard work with a short time 
period free of competition, while the limited term benefits the public by ensuring 
that the knowledge passes into the public domain for the benefit of all.16 We should 
not forget, then, that  
a patent is a monopoly because its only value as an incentive depends 
upon securing to its owner monopoly power over the invention. That is 
the only thing that gives the possibility of profit. The economic power of 
monopoly is the mainspring of the patent system, a system whose ultimate 
purpose is the public good. Weaken or destroy the monopoly and you 
weaken or destroy the system.17  
1. Exclusionary Right Defined by Patent Claims 
Interestingly, though patents are intellectual property, they are treated as personal 
property by statute18 and have attributes similar to a deed for real property.19 The 
right to exclude granted by a patent is defined by its claims20 which are found at the 
end of the patent specification.21 The claims describe the “metes and bounds” of the 
patented invention,22 giving the public notice as to what has been invented,23 like a 
fence gives the public notice of the boundary of real property. Furthermore, the 
claim is essential to determining whether a patent right has been infringed—“it is the 
claim . . . that distinguishes what infringes from what does not.”24  
Claims define “the patented invention with a series of limiting words or phrases, 
usually referred to as ‘claim limitations.’”25 It is these limiting words and phrases 
that are used to determine if a patent has been infringed.26 
Possibly because of its significant legal role,27 the Supreme Court has said that 
the “specification and claims of a patent . . . constitute one of the most difficult legal 
                                                           
 16 See id. at 12-13. 
 17 Rich, supra note 10, at 524 (emphasis added). 
 18 35 U.S.C.S. § 261 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 19 PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 6 (“[T]he claims of a patent are 
legal documents like the descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed.”). 
 20 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 76-77. 
 21 35 U.S.C.S. § 112(b) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 22 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 98 (“[C]laims are not technical descriptions of 
the disclosed inventions but are legal documents like the descriptions of lands by metes and 
bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed but do not describe the land.”); PATENTS 
AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 18. 
 23 See HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 76-77. 
 24 Id. at 76 (citing Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)). 
 25 Id. at 89. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Claims fulfill a notifying function in three ways: (1) describing what the inventor 
believes they invented; (2) defining the limits a competitor can stay outside of to avoid 
infringement; and (3) providing evidence of what the Patent and Trademark Office believes is 
distinguished in the invention from prior art (prior inventions). See id. at 76. After the patent 
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instruments to draw with accuracy.”28 Patent claims have also been described as a 
“legal nightmare.”29 The difficulty of crafting patent claims is an important concept 
to keep in mind when exploring the way in which courts have applied patent 
infringement doctrines and any resulting legal problems. 
2. Product and Process Claims 
Not every new idea is patentable.30 What is patentable is limited by statute to 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.”31 The language of the current statute is 
identical to that of the Patent Act of 1793 except for the substitution of “process” for 
“art.”32 This Note will focus on patented products and processes.33 Understanding 
the difference between these two categories of patentable subject matter is critical. 
The claim limitations in a patent covering a product34 describe a tangible item.35 
It is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of 
devices.”36 Components of an assembly might be common, well-known items, but 
when combined together in a new way they constitute a patentable invention.37 
“Invention itself is the process of combining prior art in a nonobvious manner.”38 
Claims covering a combination of devices are also known as “system” claims.39 
System claims can be used to describe a network of computer servers working 
                                                           
term expires, the specifications and claims of a patent also serve to teach others how to 
practice the invention. See PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 13. 
 28 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 74 (citing Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 
(1892)). 
 29 Id. at 75 (“Patent claims can be a legal nightmare.”). 
 30 Abstract ideas are specifically not patentable. Id. at 293. 
 31 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 32 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 291. “Method” is another word that can be used 
to describe a patented “process.” 35 U.S.C.S. § 100(b) (LexisNexis 2012). For the sake of 
consistency, however, the word “process” will be used in this Note unless “method” appears 
in a direct quote. 
 33 The patentability of different subcategories of products or processes is a topic outside 
the scope of this Note. 
 34 A patented machine is also called an “apparatus” or “product.” See, e.g., HARMON ON 
PATENTS, supra note 8, at 295. For the remainder of this Note, the term “product” will be used 
for consistency unless an equivalent term is used in a direct quote. 
 35 In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 36 Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570 (1863). 
 37 PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 15. 
 38 Id. (citing In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 39 Kerry L. Timbers, One Hand Taketh Away, the Other Giveth: For Method Claims, It's 
Tough to Prove Joint Infringement, But for System Claims, It's Easier, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 
5533 (2011); see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/10
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together to deliver email40 or the collection and processing of data to be delivered to 
an end customer of a telephone company.41 
Process claims, in contrast to product claims, do not describe a tangible item.42 
Instead, process claim limitations describe an act, or series of acts,43 and “consist[] 
of doing something, and therefore [have] to be carried out or performed.”44 Thus, a 
process must be “performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced 
to a different state or thing.”45 If the steps described in a process patent did not 
transform some kind of object, they would be merely mental processes, and would 
not be patent-eligible.46 
The steps of a process do not have to be performed in a particular order “unless 
logic, grammar, or the content of the specification dictates otherwise.”47 Process 
steps may even be performed simultaneously or begin before the previous step 
completes.48 
Though system claims are derived from product claims, many patented systems 
can also be described using process claims because process steps can describe the 
way devices in a system interact.49 Inventors in some cases may choose to describe 
their inventions by one or both of these types of claims if they think one or the other 
claim type better protects their intellectual property rights.50 
B. Patent Infringement 
This section summarizes the current law of patent infringement, based on both 
statutory and case law, to provide a footing for discussion of other patent 
infringement doctrines and eventually, the Last Step Rule.  
                                                           
 40 NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1287-88. 
 41 Centillion Data Sys., 631 F.3d at 1281. 
 42 In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 43 A process can also be described as a series of “steps” to be performed. Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
 46 See HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 293; PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
supra note 11, at 58-59 (“Concepts and ideas are not patentable.”). For the remainder of this 
Note, it is assumed that the transformed object may be physical or virtual, that is, stored in 
computer memory and manipulated by software. Further discussion of patent-eligible subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 47 Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Fore Sys., 62 Fed. App’x. 951, 954-55 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (citing Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); 
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 48 See ROBERT FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 4:3 (6th ed. 
2013) (citing Altiris, Inc., 318 F.3d 1363). 
 49 See Timbers, supra note 39 (noting that “parallel” system and method claims can be 
written to describe the same invention). 
 50 Id.; Nicole D. Galli & Edward Gecovich, Cloud Computing and the Doctrine of Joint 
Infringement: “Current Impact” and Future Possibilities, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 673, 692 (2012). 
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Patent “[i]nfringement is the act of trespassing upon the property rights defined 
by the patent claims.”51 Just like trespass, patent infringement is a tort.52 In patent 
infringement trials, 
two questions arise. The first is, what is the thing patented; the second, 
has that thing been constructed, used, or sold by the defendants. The first 
is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the letters-
patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim 
annexed to them. The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a 
jury.53 
Though the Supreme Court made the above statement in 1853,54 it was not until 
the 1990s that the Court decided that claim limitations should be construed by the 
court as a matter of law.55 Because patents grant patentees the right to exclude others 
from practicing their inventions,56 at trial “[t]he burden is on the patentee to show 
infringement, literal or by equivalents,57 by a preponderance of the evidence.”58 
The rules governing patent infringement claims are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
This provision was established by the Patent Act of 1952, which codified the 
common law patent infringement doctrines at the time.59 The current language of 
subsections (a) through (c) of § 271, which has not changed significantly since the 
1952 act,60 is presented below: 
§ 271. Infringement of patent 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [title], whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
                                                           
 51 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 131 n.2 (citing Hoechst-Roussel Pharm. Inc. v. 
Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 52 Id. at 131. 
 53 Id. at 78 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853)); see also Fromson v. 
Advance Offset Plate Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 54 HARMON ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 78. 
 55 Id. at 78-79 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 56 Supra Part II.A.1. 
 57 This is a reference to the doctrine of equivalents. “[U]nder [this] doctrine[,] a product or 
process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused 
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner Jenkinson Co. 
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). 
 58 PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 466-67. 
 59 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Rich, supra note 10, 
at 537). 
 60 Compare Rich, supra note 10, at 546 (providing the language of the 1952 version of the 
patent infringement statute), with 35 U.S.C.S. § 271 (LexisNexis 2012) (the current version of 
the patent infringement statute, which includes language making one who imports patented 
goods into the United States liable for direct or contributory infringement). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/10
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United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer. 
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into 
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in 
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.61 
The statute creates three types of infringement: direct,62 induced,63 and 
contributory.64 Induced and contributory infringement are two different forms of 
what is called “indirect” infringement.65 Direct and indirect infringement are 
discussed in more detail below. 
1. Direct Infringement 
A patent is directly infringed by “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent.”66 Direct 
patent infringement is a strict liability tort in that a finding of knowledge or intent is 
not required.67 
For infringement to be found, every claim limitation must be practiced.68 Each 
limitation might be practiced in a final product,69 or the limitations might be met 
when the product is assembled by another.70 Furthermore, courts have interpreted 
                                                           
 61 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2012). Subsections (a), (b), and (c) address direct, 
induced, and contributory infringement, respectively. The remaining subsections, (d) through 
(i), are not discussed in this Note. 
 62 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 63 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(b) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 64 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(c) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 65 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 66 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 67 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1307 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 68 The term “practice” in patent law means “[t]o make and use (a patented invention)” or 
“[t]o build a physical embodiment of an invention.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (9th ed. 
2011). 
 69 Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 3, 1999) (“To establish direct infringement, every limitation set forth in a patent 
claim must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial equivalent.”). 
 70 Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (mentioning that if anyone infringed the plaintiff’s patent it was the surgeons who 
assembled the patented product to the bone of a patient). 
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“uses” broadly,71 such that someone who uses a patented system, even if all of the 
components of the system are not physically controlled by them, is liable for direct 
infringement.72 The requirement that all claim limitations be practiced has been 
interpreted, in the case of patented processes, as requiring that each step be 
performed by the same party.73 This difference in treatment between products and 
processes exists even though the patent statute does not differentiate between the 
type of claim being infringed.74 
2. Indirect Infringement 
When a defendant participates in or encourages infringement, but does not 
directly infringe a patent, the normal recourse under the law is for the court to apply 
the standards for liability under indirect infringement.75 Indirect infringement can be 
either induced76 or contributory.77 
At common law, both of these doctrines were combined under a single concept 
of “contributory infringement,” which was based on the concept of joint liability in 
tort.78 Historically, liability for common law contributory infringement attached to 
one who “makes and sells one element of a patented combination with the intention 
and for the purpose of bringing about its use in such a combination.”79 Common law 
contributory infringement was codified into two separate actions by Congress in the 
Patent Act of 1952: induced and contributory infringement.80  
                                                           
 71 Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1913) (“The right to use is a 
comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into service any given 
invention.”). 
 72 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the defendant’s customers used an email system when they sent and received 
messages); Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (holding that on-demand use of a system constitutes direct infringement). 
 73 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Direct 
infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a claimed 
method or product.” (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 
(1997))). 
 74 See 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012); Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (stating that Congress did not intend that products and processes be treated 
differently). 
 75 See, e.g., BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d 1371; Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 76 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(b) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 77 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(c) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 78 See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); Akamai II, 
692 F.3d at 1312 (citing Rich, supra note 10, at 537). 
 79 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Solva Waterproof Glue Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 
251 F. 64, 73-74 (7th Cir. 1918)). 
 80 See Rich, supra note 10, at 537-59. 
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Induced infringement is found when the alleged infringer takes affirmative steps 
to bring about a desired result.81 Though 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) does not mention an 
intent requirement for induced infringement, the Supreme Court has inferred from 
the statute that “at least some intent is required.”82 The concept of induced 
infringement was expanded recently in the Akamai II decision where the court held 
that induced infringement could be found even though direct infringement was not.83 
Contributory infringement is found when someone sells a component used in a 
patented product or process, knowing that the component is “specially adapted” for 
use in infringing a known patent, as long as the component is not a “staple article or 
commodity” that is used for a substantial non-infringing use.84 Contributory 
infringement is different from induced infringement because it requires the selling of 
or offering to sell a component used to infringe, whereas induced infringement does 
not.85 
Unlike direct infringement, which is a strict liability tort,86 both forms of indirect 
infringement include a requirement that the accused party have knowledge of the 
patent at issue.87 This knowledge requirement is the same for both induced and 
contributory infringement.88 A finding of willful blindness is sufficient to show 
knowledge.89 
Direct infringement is a prerequisite of indirect infringement.90 This requirement 
is not explicitly stated in the statute, but is logically implied.91 After all, an act 
cannot be induced or contributed to unless that act has actually occurred.92 
                                                           
 81 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011) (“The addition 
of the adverb ‘actively’ suggests that the inducement must involve the taking of affirmative 
steps to bring about the desired result.”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1306. 
 84 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(c) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 85 See Rich, supra note 10, at 538-39 (describing the difference between subsections (b) 
and (c) of 35 U.S.C. § 271). 
 86 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1307 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 87 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 2069. 
 90 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1308 (“That principle, that there can be no indirect infringement 
without direct infringement, is well settled.” (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 
406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 
341 (1964); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 12 (1912))); see also Dynacore Holdings 
Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004); RF Delaware, Inc. v. 
Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. 
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Epcon Gas Sys. Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 
279 F.3d 1022, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 
803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); Avery Dennison Corp. v. UCB Films PLC, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13594, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1997). 
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C. Divided Infringement 
This section describes three ways that courts have responded when an accused 
infringer is one of two or more parties whose actions have combined to perform 
every step of a patented process. This splitting of performance of a process between 
multiple parties will be referred to as “divided infringement” for the remainder of 
this Note. 
1. The Single-Entity Rule 
It is a fundamental principle, held since the 1800s, that directly infringing a 
process patent has required the practicing of every step in the claimed process.93 This 
has not changed.94 This rule has been extended by the Federal Circuit, however, to 
also require that each claimed limitation of a patented process be practiced by a 
single entity.95 Divided infringement, therefore, could be used to escape liability 
under this rule.96 
This rule applies only to patented processes and not to systems or combinations. 
In Centillion and NTP the Federal Circuit held that patented systems are used when 
the user of the system puts the entire system into service, even if the user is not in 
physical control of every element of the system.97 Similarly, claimed combinations 
                                                           
 91 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1308 (“The reason for that rule is simple: There is no such thing 
as attempted patent infringement, so if there is no infringement, there can be no indirect 
liability for infringement.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524, 530 (1892); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 
102 U.S. 222, 230 (1880). 
 94 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); BMC Res., 
Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. 
Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1963); Haynes Stellite Co. v. Osage 
Metal Co., 110 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1939). 
 95 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, 
Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also id. at 1380 (“[L]iability for infringement 
requires a party to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the patented invention, meaning the entire 
patented invention.”); Joy Techs., Inc., 6 F.3d at 775 (“A method claim is directly infringed 
only by one practicing the patented method.”). Contra Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1322 (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (“The word ‘whoever’ in § 271(a) does not support the single-entity rule.”). For 
further discussion of the genesis of the “single-entity” rule and whether direct infringement of 
a method patent must be performed by a single entity, see Robinson, supra note 5, at 84-87 
(2012). 
 96 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380-81. 
 97 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“We hold that the on-demand operation is a ‘use’ of the system as a matter of law. The 
customer puts the system as a whole into service, i.e., controls the system and obtains benefit 
from it.”); see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (holding that a system was “used” in the U.S. even though a portion of the system was 
located outside of the U.S.); see 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
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are considered made for the purposes of direct infringement98 when the customer 
assembles all of the pieces into the patented combination.99 
2. Joint Infringement 
Joint infringement is a judicially created doctrine, derived from direct 
infringement, intended to close the divided infringement loophole left open by the 
single-entity rule.100 Under the single-entity rule, a patented process is not directly 
infringed if its steps are performed by more than one party.101 Therefore, 
performance of a patented process could be divided among multiple parties to avoid 
liability.102 
To adequately protect the interests of the patentee, the courts recognized that 
would-be infringers should not be able to avoid liability simply by agreeing to have 
another party perform one or more of the steps of a patented process.103 As a remedy, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that if one of the parties controlled 
or directed the others, then they could be found to have jointly infringed the 
process.104 The relationship of the parties under this test was considered akin to an 
agency relationship—if one of the parties was standing in for the other, they would 
be considered one entity, jointly infringing the patented process together.105 The 
relationship between the parties is critical to a finding of joint infringement.106 If the 
                                                           
 98 See 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012).  
 99 See Cross Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]f anyone makes the claimed apparatus, it is the surgeons . . . [b]ecause 
Medtronic does not itself make an apparatus with the ‘interface’ portion in contact with 
bone.”). 
 100 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 87 (“Despite the . . . "single entity" rule[] seemingly 
requiring the identification of a single infringer for direct infringement, courts have 
recognized that some form of joint infringement may occur and therefore joint liability should 
be assigned.”). Historically, indirect infringers were also called joint infringers, as they were 
jointly liable for the direct infringement performed by another. Though the parties were 
known to have jointly infringed a patent, they were liable under the theory of contributory 
infringement. This is not the same as the modern doctrine of joint infringement, which is 
applied when two or more parties work together to infringe a patented process. See HARMON 
ON PATENTS, supra note 8, at 191; see also Robinson, supra note 5, 77-84. 
 101 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1382 (“Without this direction or control of both the 
debit networks and the financial institutions, Paymentech did not perform or cause to be 
performed each and every element of the claims.”). 
 102 See id. at 1381 (“This court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or 
direction for a finding of joint infringement may in some circumstances allow parties to enter 
into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement.”). 
 103 Id. (“A party cannot avoid infringement, however, simply by contracting out steps of a 
patented process to another entity.”). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Under 
BMC Resources, the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law 
would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed 
by another party that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”).  
 106 See id.; BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d 1373. 
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parties are related only through an “arms-length” transaction, then joint infringement 
will not be found.107 
3. Inducement-Only Infringement 
In Akamai II, the Federal Circuit chose not to address the standards for direct 
infringement of process claims in the divided infringement situation,108 though both 
the single-entity rule and joint infringement were central to the decisions being 
reheard.109 Instead, the court expanded induced infringement, creating a new 
“inducement-only” rule.110  
Under the inducement-only rule, induced infringement may be found if every 
step of a process is performed, even if the patentee cannot prove that the steps were 
performed by a single entity.111 This would seem to ignore the general rule that 
direct infringement is required to find indirect infringement, but the court stated 
explicitly that this principle was not changed.112 To resolve this seeming 
contradiction, the court explained that “[r]equiring proof that there has been direct 
infringement as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as requiring 
proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer.”113 Consequently, 
proof of infringement by a single entity is still required for direct infringement of a 
patent process following the Akamai II decision.114 Presumably, similar proof is 
required to prove contributory infringement as that form of indirect infringement was 
not addressed in Akamai II. 
                                                           
 107 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381. 
 108 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also Lynn C. Tyler, 
Akamai and McKesson: A Better Route to a Better Result?, 84 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 843 (2012); Dennis Crouch, Joint Infringement: Federal Circuit 
Changes the Law of Inducement, PATENTLYO.COM (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/joint-infringement-federal-circuit-changes-the-law-
of-inducement.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
 109 Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Because Limelight did not perform all of 
the steps of the asserted method claims, and the record contains no basis on which to attribute 
to Limelight the actions of its customers who carried out the other steps, this court affirms the 
finding of noninfringement.”); McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7531, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (“Because McKesson is unable to attribute the 
performance of all the steps of the asserted method claims to a single party—namely, Epic's 
healthcare-provider customers—this court affirms the finding of noninfringement.”). 
 110 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 1306 (majority opinion) (“[W]e hold that all the steps of a claimed method must 
be performed in order to find induced infringement, but that it is not necessary to prove that 
all the steps were committed by a single entity.”). 
 112 Id. at 1308 (“That principle, that there can be no indirect infringement without direct 
infringement, is well settled.”). 
 113 Id. at 1308-09. 
 114 Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 709 F.3d 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“In the 
recent en banc decision of this court in [Akamai II], we decided an issue of divided 
infringement under § 271(b), rather than under § 271(a). . . . We found that ‘we have no 
occasion at this time to revisit any of those principles regarding the law of divided 
infringement as it applies to liability for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).’”). 
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Akamai II was decided recently, so the implications of this new rule are not yet 
known. However, the inducement-only rule—like the doctrine of joint infringement 
and the single-entity rule—applies only to patented processes,115 which may limit its 
impact.116 
III. THE DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT PROBLEM 
Having described the single-entity rule, joint infringement, and inducement-only 
infringement above, the shortcomings of each will be discussed below. This 
discussion will show that divided infringement of process claims has been difficult 
to address, while providing background for solutions proposed by others and for the 
Last Step Rule proposed by this Note. 
A. The Single-Entity Rule Misinterprets § 271(a) 
As explained earlier, the single-entity rule for direct infringement of process 
patents requires that each step described in the patent be performed by a single 
entity.117 At the time this standard was adopted in BMC, the majority noted that 
some patent holders would be without redress.118 Though patentees may find some 
relief through the inducement-only rule introduced in Akamai II,119 the single-entity 
rule persists as a barrier to enforcement against infringers whose actions combine to 
directly infringe process claims. 
Contrary to the holding in BMC, the Supreme Court has held many times that 
every step of a process must be practiced but has never held that one entity must 
practice each step.120 Furthermore, Judge Newman, dissenting in Akamai II, asserted 
that a narrow interpretation of “whoever” in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) as referring to a 
                                                           
 115 Crouch, supra note 108 (“The majority also limited its opinion to infringement of 
method claims.”). 
 116 See Tech. Patents LLC v. T-Mobile UK, Ltd., 700 F.3d 482, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(applying the rule from Centillion as the patent at issue claimed a system and not a process). 
 117 See supra Part II.C. 
 118 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Court 
in BMC acknowledged that infringement could be avoided in some cases, but argued that 
these concerns could “usually be offset by proper claim drafting.” Id. The court went on to 
cite an article by Professor Mark A. Lemley that advocated for just such an approach. Id. 
(citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 
(2005)). 
 119 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 120 Joint Infringement: When Multiple Actors Work in Concert, PATENTLYO.COM (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/joint-infringement-when-multiple-actors-
work-in-concert.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (“In several post-1952 cases, the Supreme 
Court has stated that an invention must actually be infringed—i.e., practiced—before someone 
can be liable for indirect infringement. However, in those cases, the Supreme Court did not 
state that the actual infringement must be performed by a single entity.”). 
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single entity is contrary to a proper interpretation of the statute.121 Judge Newman 
has also argued that the single-entity rule conflicts with established precedent.122 
In support of the single-entity rule, the BMC Court cited Joy Technologies.123 
Language in Joy Technologies indicates support for the single-entity rule: “A method 
claim is directly infringed only by one practicing the patented method.”124 This 
statement, however, is dictum. The holding of the case was directed to the issue of 
whether the selling of equipment to perform a patented process was infringement, 
not whether direct infringement of a process ever occurred or was practiced by 
multiple parties.125 
Warner-Jenkenson is also cited as supporting the premise that method claim 
infringement is found only when a single party performs each step.126 In that case, as 
acknowledged by the court in BMC, the Supreme Court noted that the “[a]pplication 
of the doctrine of equivalents . . . is akin to determining literal infringement.”127 As 
with the statement from Joy Technologies, this statement cannot carry the weight 
assigned to it by the court in BMC.  
In Warner-Jenkenson, the Court addressed the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents; process claim infringement is only mentioned in this context.128 The 
Supreme Court explained that two different legal rules—literal infringement and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents—were analogous, reinforcing the 
long-standing requirement that all claim limitations be practiced for infringement to 
be found.129 Simply requiring proof of performance of each step of a process to find 
infringement does not support the proposition that those steps must be performed by 
a single entity. Therefore, the support provided by the BMC Court, though 
persuasive, does not directly stand for an interpretation of section 271(a) that 
requires a single entity to perform every step of a patented process before direct 
infringement can be found. 
B. Joint Infringement Leaves Patent Rights Unprotected 
The central flaw with the doctrine of joint infringement is that it does not provide 
relief for a patentee whose process patent is being practiced by multiple parties who 
                                                           
 121 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1322. But see id. at 1347-48 (Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing to the 
contrary). 
 122 McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531, at *39 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To the extent that recent panel rulings . . . 
appear to stand for an absolute requirement that there must be direct infringement by a single 
entity who performs or controls or directs every step of the claimed method before there can 
be indirect infringement, these rulings are contravened by precedent.”). 
 123 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379. 
 124 Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 125 Id. at 773-74. 
 126 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1378. 
 127 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
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have an arms-length relationship between them.130 Because the doctrine of joint 
infringement requires that one party be the “mastermind,”131 controlling or directing 
others, the actions of arms-length customers who perform steps of the patented 
process do not accrue to the alleged infringer.132  
The doctrine of joint infringement would not be necessary but for the single-
entity rule.133 Well before the existence of the patent statute, the common law had 
already worked out ways to handle multiple party infringement of process claims 
through indirect infringement.134 Rather than create a new doctrine to handle these 
situations, the courts should have looked to older cases decided under common law 
contributory infringement.135 These cases would still be applicable because the 
Patent Act of 1952 codified the common law.136 Had this been done, the doctrine of 
joint infringement as we know it today would not have been necessary. 
An approach similar to the common law approach was taken in the E.I. Dupont 
case by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.137 In this case, 
the court found the defendants, Monsanto Company and BASF Corporation, liable 
for indirect infringement when they manufactured a form of nylon and then supplied 
the material to another company, CaMac, to finish the process by performing the 
final two steps.138 The court held that CaMac was liable for direct infringement, as 
they completed the process, while Monsanto and BASF were liable for induced or 
contributory infringement.139  
In this case, Monsanto had entered into an agreement to supply nylon to 
CaMac140 and BASF had not.141 Despite Monsanto’s agreement with CaMac, the 
court held that “[s]ection 271(a) simply provides no basis to hold Monsanto liable 
for its conduct in connection with the manufacture of CaMac’s . . . products.”142 The 
court also held that BASF was not liable as a direct infringer for the same reason.143 
                                                           
 130 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.; see also Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 133 See supra Part II.C. 
 134 See, e.g., Solva Waterproof Glue Co. v. Peerless Glue Co., 251 F. 64 (7th Cir. 1918); 
Peerless Equipment Co. v. W. H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1937). 
 135 See, e.g., Solva Waterproof Glue Co., 251 F. 64. 
 136 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 137 E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1995). 
 138 Id. at 720-22.  
 139 Id. at 733 (“Based upon the Court's previous findings and conclusions, it seems clear 
that CaMac directly infringes the Anton patent under § 271(a) with regard to the . . . products 
that it manufactures pursuant to the claimed process.”). 
 140 Id. at 720-21.  
 141 Id. at 721-22.  
 142 Id. at 735 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).  
 143 Id.  
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Had the analysis pattern from E.I. Dupont been applied in BMC, an arms-length 
relationship between the parties might not have undermined the property rights of 
the plaintiff patentees.144 
C. Inducement-Only Infringement Lacks a Firm Foundation 
Inducement-only infringement, though intended to help patentees who had no 
recourse under the single-entity rule and joint infringement, creates more problems 
than it solves. Many arguments against the rule can be found in the two dissenting 
opinions arguing against the majority in Amakai II. The dissenters argued that the 
majority created a rule that would lead to abuse by plaintiffs;145 would have a 
negative effect on the market;146 is contrary to precedent and the plain language of 
the statute;147 misinterprets legislative history;148 expands indirect infringement so 
far that the statutory scheme is undermined;149 and is improperly based on criminal 
law principles.150 The ruling was also challenged as it made “a sweeping change to 
the nation's patent policy that is not for this court to make.”151  
Though the majority in Akamai II restated and supported the rule that direct 
infringement is a prerequisite for a finding of indirect infringement,152 this principle 
cannot coexist with the inducement-only rule. Because there is no “attempted 
infringement,” one cannot be liable for inducing infringement that did not happen.153 
Holding otherwise is logically inconsistent.154 This is not the foundation on which 
the court should be building new rules designed to address the divided infringement 
problem. 
                                                           
 144 Despite holding Monsanto and BASF liable for patent infringement, the court found that 
the patent at issue was invalid, and therefore Monsanto and BASF paid no damages. Id. at 
770. 
 145 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. at 1321 (“[T]urmoil will surely be created, to the detriment of technological advance 
and its industrial development, for stability and clarity of the law are essential to innovative 
commerce.”). 
 147 Id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. at 1341. 
 149 Id. at 1338 (“[S]ubverts the statutory scheme.”). 
 150 See id. at 1343-47. 
 151 Id. at 1342. 
 152 Id. at 1308 (majority opinion) (“That principle, that there can be no indirect 
infringement without direct infringement, is well settled.”). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Though finding indirect infringement without direct infringement is logically 
inconsistent, that is exactly what the majority did in Akamai II. The logical problem with the 
majority opinion was noted by Judge Newman in her dissent when she said “[m]y colleagues 
hedge, and while acknowledging that ‘there can be no indirect infringement without direct 
infringement,’ [the] court holds that there need not be direct infringers. I need not belabor the 
quandary of how there can be direct infringement but no direct infringers.” Id. at 1328 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT PROBLEM 
In this Section, four alternative solutions to the divided infringement problem are 
discussed. The first solution is an alternative to inducement-only infringement 
presented by Judge Newman in her dissent in Akamai II. The second and third have 
been proposed by commentators since the Akamai II case was decided in August of 
2012. The fourth approach has been suggested by commentators and courts and is 
directed toward the drafting of patent claims.  
A. Apportionment of Liability 
In her dissent in Akamai II, Judge Newman suggested that divided infringement 
of process patents could be remedied through apportionment of liability.155 This 
approach would allow courts to look at all of the parties who practiced one or more 
steps of the patent and determine their portion of direct infringement liability based 
on a number of factors.156 
Customers who had no knowledge of the patented process may find relief in this 
approach because “awareness” is a factor in determining an accused infringer’s share 
of responsibility.157 Joint infringement as a legal theory is built on direct 
infringement,158 however, and direct infringement does not include a knowledge 
component.159  
Judge Linn’s dissent in Akamai II criticizes the apportionment of liability 
approach by applying it to patented products, arguing that suppliers of each and 
every component of an assembled product would become liable under this 
standard.160 Judge Newman dismissed this critique as not passing the “chuckle 
test.”161 It is settled that the direct infringer of a product claim is the one who 
“makes” the product,162 while suppliers are only liable as indirect infringers163 (and 
only then if they had knowledge of the patented product).164 
In spite of Judge Linn’s critique not passing the “chuckle test,”165 it is important 
as it draws attention to the courts’ disparate handling of product and process patents 
under the doctrine of joint infringement.  
                                                           
 155 Id. at 1331. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000)). 
 158 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 87. 
 159 See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (majority opinion) (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 
F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 160 Id. at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 161 Id. at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 162 See Cross Medical Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 165 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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In Judge Newman’s dissent in McKesson, she stated that “distinguishing between 
practice of an element of a system, and practice of an element of a method, does not 
add clarity or predictability to patent law.”166 The apportionment of liability 
approach proposed by Judge Newman in Akamai II, however, would continue this 
separate treatment of patented systems and methods.  
Under the current law, one who practices an element of a patented system “uses” 
the entire system, making them liable for direct infringement under § 271(a) of the 
patent statute.167 The creator of the infringing system may then be liable under an 
indirect infringement theory. Under the apportionment of liability theory, however, 
all of the parties who practice steps of the patented process would be liable for direct 
infringement. If a patentee described their invention with parallel system and process 
claims, the same action by their customer would result in direct infringement of the 
system claim and indirect infringement of the process claim. This inconsistency 
should not be perpetuated. 
B. Flexible Joint Infringement 
A more “flexible”168 approach to the divided infringement problem was proposed 
by Professor W. Keith Robinson in an article published shortly after the Akamai II 
decision.169 An interesting aspect of Professor Robinson’s proposal is that it would 
take into account the form and quality of the claims drafted by the patentee.170  
In Robinson’s proposal, when a claim is drafted as a single-actor claim,171 a 
factors-based test would be applied172 using factors derived from the Golden Hour 
case.173 To determine whether a party should be jointly liable for divided 
infringement, courts would look at whether there was a collaboration or partnership 
between the parties, whether there was concerted action among the parties, and 
whether the parties benefitted financially from the infringement.174 To this list 
Robinson adds that courts could examine the intent of the parties and the nature of 
the infringing activities they performed.175 
                                                           
 166 McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531, at *35 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1318 (majority 
opinion) (stating that Congress did not intend for there to be two different standards for 
product and process patents).  
 167 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 168 Robinson, supra note 5, at 65 (“[T]he law should prescribe a more flexible procedure to 
analyze joint infringement liability.”). 
 169 Compare id. at 59, with Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1301. 
 170 Robinson, supra note 5, at 109. 
 171 Id. at 110 (“[A] claim in which all the steps of a method claim are directed to a single 
infringer or the claim does not require performance of the steps by multiple parties.”). 
 172 Id. at 110-15. 
 173 Id. at 110. 
 174 Id. at 111-13. 
 175 Id. at 113-14. 
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If, on the other hand, a claim is drafted with multiple parties in mind, Robinson 
proposes that courts would determine if there is a nexus between “‘interactivity’ of a 
method claim (that is, the reason why the claims require more than one actor) and 
the patentability of the claim.”176 The benefit of this approach is that it allows courts 
to adapt to different factual scenarios; both patentees with claims directed to a single 
infringer177 and those with “truly innovative” interactive methods can effectively 
exclude others from practicing their invention.178 
A more flexible approach may resolve many of the issues presented by divided 
infringement of process claims. However, this particular approach would continue 
the dissimilar treatment of product and process claims just like the apportionment of 
liability approach advocated by Judge Newman in Akamai II.179 
C. Broad Interpretation of “Use” or “Sells” in § 271(a) 
Another approach to the divided infringement problem was proposed in a BNA 
Insight article by Lynn C. Tyler.180 This approach would use a broad interpretation 
of “use” or “sells” in § 271(a) to find a party liable for direct infringement even if its 
customer performed the final step of a process.181 According to this approach, the 
alleged infringer “uses” or “sells” the process by providing it to its customer.182  
This solution would successfully address the arms-length relationship problem 
caused by joint infringement but would seem to make indirect infringement doctrines 
superfluous. If the same thinking were applied to a patented assembly, a 
manufacturer of a component of the assembly could be found to directly infringe 
even though it did not put the final assembly together. This is inconsistent with 
precedent that would find the end customer liable for direct infringement and the 
manufacturer liable for indirect infringement.183 
D. “Better” Claim Drafting 
Because the court will not unilaterally alter patent claim language “to remedy . . . 
ill-conceived claims,”184 many commentators have made the argument that better 
claim drafting would solve the problems caused by divided infringement of process 
                                                           
 176 Id. at 116. 
 177 See id. at 119. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See supra Part III.A. 
 180 Tyler, supra note 108, at 871. 
 181 See id. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also 
Peerless Equipment Co. v. W. H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1937); see also Solva 
Waterproof Glue Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 251 F. 64 (7th Cir. 1918). 
 184 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Sage 
Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
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patents.185 The thinking behind this approach is that if the government is going to 
grant a right to exclude others from practicing an invention, one who does not 
sufficiently define the boundaries of that right when he or she had the chance should 
not expect relief from the court when problems arise.186 
One recommended tactic would be to draft “unitary” claims—claims crafted such 
that a single actor does each step.187 These claims, however, might not be sufficient 
when the invention is by its nature interactive, making it impossible to draft claims 
with a single party in mind.188 Furthermore, legitimately innovative ideas may not 
come to light if innovative systems and processes are too hard to protect.189 
Another approach that has been advocated is the drafting of system claims to go 
along with every process claim for an interactive system.190 Though this may help 
patentees avoid the detrimental effects of the split treatment of patented products and 
processes in the courts, it would increase cost for patent preparation and is more of 
an accommodation than a solution. 
The long duration of a patent term also argues against this approach.191 Patentees 
should not lose out on the significant investment of time and money because the 
courts make an unforeseeable change in the law afterwards. If patents are intended to 
promote innovation,192 instability and uncertainty in the law would serve to 
undermine that purpose.193 Relying only on changes to claim drafting, and not 
addressing the rules applied in the courts, would avoid tackling the root of the 
problems discussed previously.194 
                                                           
 185 See Lemley et al., supra note 118, at 271-75; Ken Hobday, The Incredibly Ever-
Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement: Mutli-Actor Method Claims, 38 CAP. U.L. REV. 137, 
180 (2009). 
 186 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Sage Prods. Inc., 126 F.3d at 1425 
("[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did 
not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek 
protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”)). 
 187 Lemley et al., supra note 118, at 272. 
 188 Robinson, supra note 5, at 105-06. 
 189 See id.; Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 190 See Timbers, supra note 39. 
 191 PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 11, at 5 (“The term of a patent used to 
be 17 years. Effective June 8, 1995, the patent laws were amended to change the term of a 
patent from 17 years measured from the date the patent issued to 20 years measured from the 
filing date of the earliest U.S. application for which priority benefit is claimed.”). 
 192 See supra Part II.A. 
 193 Id.; see also Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[S]tability and 
clarity of the law are essential to innovative commerce.”). 
 194 See supra Part III. 
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V. THE LAST STEP RULE 
Having considered the current state of the law directed toward divided 
infringement of processes,195 its problems,196 and the solutions proposed by others,197 
this section proposes a straightforward solution for the divided infringement 
problem: the Last Step Rule. Under the Last Step Rule a party is liable for direct 
infringement of a patented process if they perform the last step in the process. 
In the discussion below, I will detail the impact that the Last Step Rule would 
have on indirect and joint infringement and show that it is supported by statute and 
precedent. I will then demonstrate how the rule would apply to the actions of the 
parties in the recent Akamai II decision. Lastly, I will discuss how the rule could be 
implemented and concerns that may arise if it were adopted. 
A. Basics 
At its heart, the Last Step Rule treats patented processes just like patented 
products; the steps of a process under this approach are regarded as components of a 
patented assembly. Just as a patented assembly is directly infringed when it is 
completed, so too are patented processes directly infringed under the Last Step Rule 
when they are completed. 
1. Steps as Components 
Justice Bradley’s definition of a patented process from 1876 still holds true 
today: “A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”198 This concept is central to 
the Last Step Rule.  
A direct infringer is one who “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” a patented 
product.199 This is true even if the entire product or components of the product were 
made by another.200 At the time that the product is made, used, offered for sale or 
sold, the infringer is benefitting from every element of the invention. Because of 
this, there is no single-entity rule for products. 
Unlike products, processes cannot be sold or made.201 Processes are directly 
infringed only when they are used.202 While a system or assembly may be infringed 
when its components are put together into an “operable assembly,” the court in NTP 
stated that “there is no corresponding whole operable assembly of a process 
                                                           
 195 See supra Part II. 
 196 See supra Part III. 
 197 See supra Part IV. 
 198 Compare Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (defining what is a patentable 
process), with In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] process . . . consists of 
a series of acts or steps.”). 
 199 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 200 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 201 See Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 202 See id.; see also Robinson, supra note 5, at 86-87. 
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claim.”203 I disagree. Each step of a process works together in combination—just 
like the components of an assembly—to produce a desired outcome.  
Just as the user of a patented system “puts that system . . . into service . . . and 
obtains benefit from it”,204 whoever performs the last step of a patented process has 
put into service and obtained benefit from—and therefore used—each of the prior 
steps. These steps may not occur at the same time, but that does not prevent the 
effect of each step from being realized when the process is complete. But for the 
completion of each prior step in the process, the end result would not be achieved. 
Further reinforcing this view is the fact that each step in a process must transform 
its subject-matter.205 Every step in a process acts on an object of some kind,206 and 
acting on—transforming—an object necessarily changes its properties. If it did not, 
the step would be a patent-ineligible mental step.207 The changes made to an object 
in each step persist and accumulate over time.208 Like the components of an 
assembly are connected physically, so are process steps connected through time by 
the objects that they transform. When a process is completed, the last step carries 
with it the benefits of all previous steps. Thus, the entire process is “used” for the 
purpose of determining infringement when the last step is performed. 
2. Which Step Is Last? 
Because direct infringement under the Last Step Rule is based on the 
performance of the last step, it is important to define exactly which step is the last 
step. This would seem obvious, but the order in which steps are listed in a claim does 
not specify the order in which they must be performed. Unless an order is implied or 
specified, the steps of a process can be performed in any order, even 
simultaneously.209 As a general rule, the last step is defined as the step that 
completes the process. That is, the last step chronologically, regardless of whether 
that step was the last step listed in the claim. 
If the performance of the steps overlaps, the last step is the step which finishes 
last. Complications arise, however, when simultaneously performed steps finish at 
                                                           
 203 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972)). 
 204 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 205 The verb “transform” in this Note is to be interpreted broadly. Even if the process is tied 
to a particular machine, such as a computer, some sort of subject-matter—physical or 
digital—is being transformed. 
 206 The object may be physical, but can also be virtual—i.e. stored in computer memory. A 
virtual object has properties that are affected by steps in a process, but has been abstracted 
from its physical embodiment in the electronics inside computer memory. 
 207 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 208 In the same way, objects accumulate the actions of multiple parties as well. See Lemley 
et al., supra note 118, at 275 (“[P]hysical objects typically accumulate the contributions of 
multiple actors, so in many situations, some act of making, using, selling, or importing will 
eventually correspond to the claimed apparatus, even if based originally on contributions from 
multiple parties.”). 
 209 FABER, supra note 48, at § 4:8. 
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exactly the same time. This situation would likely be rare. That said, if it is too 
difficult for the court to determine which step finished last, both steps may be 
declared “last steps” for the purpose of finding direct infringement. If many steps are 
performed simultaneously and together they complete the process, then whoever 
performs those steps would be a direct infringer. If more than one party acted to 
complete these steps, then they would be jointly liable for direct infringement. Joint 
liability for direct infringement is discussed further below.210 
B. Impact 
The impact the Last Step Rule would have on indirect and joint infringement is 
illustrated in this Section. Currently, the single-entity rule for direct infringement of 
a process makes finding indirect infringement difficult when two or more parties 
played a role in performing the process. Joint infringement attempts to resolve this 
situation by finding direct infringement when the parties coordinated their efforts.211 
The Last Step Rule would replace the single-entity rule, thereby changing how both 
indirect and joint infringement operate. These changes would further the 
constitutionally mandated purpose of the patent law system by improving the clarity 
of the legal framework for infringement and by providing better protection for 
patentees.212 
I will refer to the diagram below throughout this Section to demonstrate more 
clearly the impact of the Last Step Rule. The four square boxes in the diagram 
represent four steps of a process. The letters in each box represent the parties 
performing those steps. In the case of steps two and four, the boxes are split to 
indicate that more than party plays a role in the performance of those steps. 
 
1. Clarifying Indirect Infringement 
By replacing the single-entity rule for direct infringement of patented processes 
with the Last Step Rule, the role of each actor in the divided infringement problem is 
more clear. To find a direct infringer the court needs to look only at who performed 
the last step. Everyone else is an indirect infringer. All that remains for the court to 
determine is whether the indirect infringers acted with the requisite intent to infringe. 
This change would bring infringement of process claims in line with that of 
product claims. The Last Step Rule would eliminate the distinction between these 
                                                          
 210 See infra Part V.B.2. 
 211 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 212 See Rich, supra note 10, at 524 (“Weaken or destroy the monopoly and you weaken or 
destroy the system.”). 
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claims that exists under the current infringement regime—a distinction that was 
never intended by Congress.213 
2. Narrowing Joint Infringement 
Because direct infringement under the Last Step Rule does involve parties 
performing prior steps, there would be no need for the current doctrine of joint 
infringement. The control or direction standard from BMC would be unnecessary.214 
A finding that a prior party controlled or directed another to perform the last step 
may, however, be evidence of knowledge for indirect infringement and possibly of 
willful infringement. 
Though joint infringement would no longer exist for the joint performance of 
multiple steps, joint liability may still arise for direct infringement when two or more 
parties perform the last step together. In this case, the parties would be jointly liable 
for direct infringement and a remedy can be apportioned appropriately.215 In other 
words, the current doctrine of joint infringement from BMC applies to joint 
performance of the entire process; joint liability for direct infringement under the 
Last Step Rule is narrowed to the case when parties jointly perform a single step.216 
3. The Last Step Rule Advances the Constitutional Purpose of Patent Law 
The constitutionally mandated purpose of the patent system is to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”217 This purpose was hampered by the effects of 
the doctrine of joint infringement as parties who operated at arms-length were not 
found to infringe.218 Conversely, inducement-only infringement goes too far in 
expanding indirect infringement.219 
The Last Step Rule would eliminate the single-entity rule, strengthening the 
rights of patentees by allowing them to enforce their right to exclude against 
infringers of their processes. At the same time, the Last Step Rule conforms to the 
statutory scheme provided by the patent statute so that indirect infringement is not 
expanded beyond its historical role. 
The Last Step Rule also is a more straightforward solution to the divided 
infringement problem than joint infringement, as it does not require courts to apply a 
balancing test. This, in turn, would lead to more predictable results for the parties 
involved in litigation and would give notice to competitors in the market looking to 
avoid potential litigation. The role of each infringing party would be clear. As 
                                                           
 213 See supra Part IV.A. 
 214 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 215 Judge Newman detailed how this might be done in her dissent in Akamai II. See Akamai 
II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1330-32 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 216 Or multiple simultaneous last steps. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 218 See supra Part III.B. 
 219 Tony Dutra, Two Petitions Filed Challenging Fed. Cir.'s Divided Infringement, 
Inducement Rulings, 85 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 337, 346 (2013) (quoting 
Epic Systems’ petition for certiorari and stating that “[t]he decision below expands liability for 
indirect infringement in a way that Congress easily could have implemented in the past 60 
years had it wished, and the holding will have far-reaching consequences”). 
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“stability and clarity of the law are essential to innovative commerce,”220 the Last 
Step Rule would advance the underlying purpose of the patent system.221 
C. Support 
The proposed Last Step Rule is supported by the language of the patent statute 
and is consistent with the statutory patent infringement scheme. It is also within the 
bounds of Supreme Court precedent. 
1. Section 271(a) Supports the Last Step Rule 
The Last Step Rule is supported by a broad reading of “uses” in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a). As stated above, whoever performs the last step of a process “uses” all of 
the steps; they have “put[] . . . into service” and “obtained benefit” from all the 
actions performed by others in the preceding steps.222 This interpretation is 
analogous to the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “use” with regards to system 
claims.223 
“Whoever” in § 271(a) has been interpreted to support the single-entity rule,224 
though some have argued it can be interpreted to apply to one or more entities.225 
Regardless, whether “whoever” in § 271(a) applies to one or multiple people is 
irrelevant to a determination of direct infringement at a process level if only the last 
step is considered.  
When examining a single step of a process, however, the issue of whether 
“whoever” applies to one or more parties may still be relevant if more than one party 
worked together to complete the last step. Joint infringement concepts—asking 
whether one party was the agent of the other—could be applied in this situation. This 
would not interfere with indirect infringement but would still prevent parties from 
avoiding liability through contracting with another. Arms-length transactions would 
no longer allow parties to avoid infringement in this case; after all, two or more 
parties cannot perform a single step of a process together without a coordinated 
effort. 
2. The Statutory Scheme is Reinforced by the Last Step Rule 
The framers of the current patent statute created two categories of infringement: 
direct and indirect.226 The courts should maintain this distinction, not render part of 
the statute meaningless.227 Under joint infringement, parties that should be 
considered indirect infringers end up being lumped together with direct infringers. 
Thus, indirect infringement becomes superfluous under the doctrine of joint 
                                                           
 220 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 221 See supra Part II.A. 
 222 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); see also supra Part V.A.1. 
 223 Centillion Data Sys., LLC, 631 F.3d at 1285. 
 224 See supra Part III.A. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See supra Part II.B. 
 227 See Lemley et al., supra note 118, at 262. 
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infringement.228 Similarly, if inducement-only infringement is followed, one has to 
ask: What is being induced if no direct infringement is found?  
Furthermore, § 271 does not indicate any intent by Congress that products and 
processes be treated differently with regards to infringement.229 As stated by the 
majority in Akamai II, “we have found no evidence to suggest that Congress 
intended to create different rules for method claims than for other types of 
claims.”230 This was not changed although Congress was aware of joint infringement 
issues when the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was recently passed.231 Where 
claim types are differentiated, they are mentioned explicitly.232 Like § 271, the Last 
Step Rule treats products and processes the same, reinforcing the statutory scheme 
established by Congress. 
3. Case Law Supports the Last Step Rule 
All steps of a process must be performed for infringement to be found.233 This 
well-established precedent is not changed by the Last Step Rule. Nor is the principle 
that direct infringement is a prerequisite for a finding of indirect infringement. The 
dividing line between direct and indirect infringement is maintained and clearly 
defined under the Last Step Rule.  
Examining a series of cases illustrates that courts have frequently applied 
reasoning similar to the Last Step Rule. In addition, the cases below provide a 
variety of factual scenarios that illustrate the interaction between direct infringement 
and indirect infringement. 
The following three cases were decided before the Patent Act of 1952 was passed 
and illustrate the application of common law contributory infringement. The 
outcome of each case would not be changed by applying the Last Step Rule. In Solva 
Waterproof Glue the court held that the defendant manufacturer of a glue base was 
liable for common contributory infringement even though the end customer 
                                                           
 228 See E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 735 (D. Del. 
1995) (“[T]he Court finds the reasoning in Joy Technologies to be instructive. As the Joy 
court reasoned, § 271(c) would be rendered meaningless if the sale of equipment to perform a 
patented process constituted direct infringement. Similarly, in this case, it seems that if 
Monsanto were liable as a direct infringer under § 271(a) for making and selling a component 
of the claimed process, then § 271(c), which imposes liability for "sell[ing] a . . . material . . . 
for use in practicing a patented process" would be superfluous. DuPont does not, however, 
assert liability under § 271(c) against Monsanto. Instead, DuPont alleges that Monsanto is 
liable under § 271(a) on a theory of joint infringement or joint manufacture.” (citing Joy 
Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
 229 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). Ironically, the majority 
decision in Akamai II perpetuates the disparate treatment of infringement of product and 
process claims, despite stating that Congress did not intend the two to be treated differently. 
Induced infringement of product claims still requires proof of direct infringement after 
Akamai II. See, e.g., Cephalon Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 11-164-SLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 101848, at *29-30 (D. Del. Jul. 22, 2013). 
 230 Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1318. 
 231 Id. at 1343 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 232 See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 233 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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performed the second—and last—step of a two-step patented process.234 Similarly, 
in Graham Paper, the defendant mulch-paper manufacturer was found liable for 
contributory infringement when it provided instructions along with mulch-paper that 
infringed on the plaintiff’s patented process for improving the growth of plants.235 
Lastly, in Peerless Equipment the defendant manufacturer was liable for contributory 
infringement because the final step of a patented process for ensuring the accurate 
fitting of parts was performed by its end customer.236 It should be noted that the 
courts deciding the above three cases made no distinction between products and 
processes when applying the rule for common law contributory infringement.237 
Unlike these earlier cases, the defendant in Metal Film238 did not perform the first 
step of the plaintiff’s patented process, which was performed by an outside supplier, 
but did perform the remaining steps.239 The court held that the defendant had 
“utilized” the plaintiff’s process, and per 35 U.S.C. § 271 was liable for 
infringement.240  
In Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate,241 the court explained that Advance was 
liable for contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) when its customers 
performed the final step of Fromson’s patented process: 
                                                           
 234 Solva Waterproof Glue Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 251 F. 64, 73 (7th Cir. 1918) (asking 
whether “a manufacturer, by producing a glue base under the conditions of this case, which is 
not an invention but which may be used, and some of which, the court finds from the 
evidence, is intended to be used in a process which is not in itself, but only in combination 
entitled to patent protection, be decreed guilty of contributory infringement, notwithstanding 
no attempt is made by the alleged contributory infringer to so use the final step himself, and 
which glue base can be and is sometimes used to manufacture other commercial adhesives 
than glue, though appellee uses it for making glue only? We think so, and hold that appellant, 
the Solva Glue Manufacturing Company, was a contributory infringer of the final product and 
of the final process.” (citing Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 
(6th Cir. 1897))). 
 235 Graham Paper Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 46 F.2d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 1931) (holding similar 
to Solva—that the manufacturer contributed to threatened infringement of customer). In 
Graham Paper, the plaintiff’s patent claimed two methods for enhancing the growth of plants 
by placing a covering on the ground around the planted area. Id. at 882. The claims recited 
two different ways in which the method could be carried out, one in three steps and another 
with four steps. Id. The defendant sold mulch paper intended to be used in this process, and 
provided their customers with instructions as to how to follow the process using their paper. 
Id. at 885. All of the steps of the patented process were to be carried out by the end user. Id. at 
885-86. The court found that the supplier of the paper was liable for common law contributory 
infringement, as their customers would have performed the “actual infringement.” Id. at 886. 
 236 Peerless Equip. Co. v. W. H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98, 105 (7th Cir. 1937) (holding the 
manufacturer liable for contributory infringement when they knew the customer would 
perform last step in a process). 
 237 Id.; Graham Paper Co., 46 F.2d 881; Solva Waterproof Glue Co., 251 F. 64. 
 238 Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 239 Id. at 111 (holding defendant liable for infringement even though outside supplier 
performed first step of process). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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It is undisputed that Advance manufactured and sold "wipe-on" plates . . . 
and that its customers applied a diazo coating to those plates. Because the 
claims include the application of a diazo coating . . . and because 
Advance's customers, not Advance, applied the diazo coating, Advance 
cannot be liable for direct infringement with respect to those plates but 
could be liable for contributory infringement.242 
The holding in Fromson, decided under the current statutory scheme, is 
consistent with cases decided before Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 271. This 
indicates that the approach to joint infringement under the Last Step Rule would 
operate properly within the current statutory framework. 
Finally, the E.I. DuPont243 case demonstrates how the Last Step Rule might 
function in a complex multiple party trial, even though the patent at issue was 
ultimately declared invalid by the court.244 The plaintiff, E.I. Dupont, sued three 
manufacturers alleging joint infringement of DuPont’s patented process for the 
manufacture of stain resistant fibers.245 In response, the court said that 
[a]lthough DuPont's theory of joint infringement is interesting, the Court 
declines to find that Monsanto is liable as a direct infringer under § 271(a) 
in connection with its conduct in practicing step (a) of the claimed process 
and selling the resulting copolymer to CaMac for manufacture of its . . . 
products. . . . Clearly, the direct infringer in this case is CaMac, who buys 
the . . . polymer from Monsanto and then uses it to perform the process 
claimed in the Anton patent.246 
The court held that defendants Monsanto and BASF were liable for indirect 
(contributory) infringement of DuPont’s patented process because they had 
performed the first step and then sold the product to CaMac for final processing.247 
The E.I. DuPont case shows that indirect and direct infringement can be applied to 
parties who perform different steps of a patented method and that they do not have to 
be lumped together as direct infringers under a theory of joint infringement. 
The above cases clearly illustrate that various courts over the last century, before 
and after the implementation of the patent statute, have found defendants liable for 
indirect infringement when they performed some of the steps of a patented process, 
leaving the remainder for a third party direct infringer. When a third party performed 
an earlier step and the defendant the last step, the defendant was held liable for direct 
infringement. Each court in these cases applied the logic of the Last Step Rule to 
reach their respective results. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit could 
have applied this same reasoning to the cases in Akamai II, as will be shown in the 
following section. 
                                                           
 242 Id. at 1567-68. 
 243 E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1995). 
 244 Id. at 739-40, 770. 
 245 See id. at 688. 
 246 Id. at 735. 
 247 Id. at 739-40. 
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D. Application to Akamai I and McKesson 
Applying the Last Step Rule to the patents at issue in the recently decided 
Akamai I and McKesson cases shows that the proposed rule is much more 
straightforward to apply than either joint infringement or inducement-only 
infringement. In each case, the claimed process is described and then the rule is 
applied. Application of the Last Step Rule to these cases does not change their 
outcome from the Akamai II decision—both defendants would still be held liable as 
infringers. However, application of the Last Step Rule to the facts of Akamai II 
brings clarity to the infringement analysis and avoids contradicting case precedent. 
1. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I) 
The patent at issue in the dispute between Akamai Technologies and Limelight 
Networks defines a system and process used to deliver content to a website viewed 
in a web browser.248 The claims defining the disputed processes read as follows:  
19. A content delivery service, comprising: 
replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of content 
servers managed by a domain other than a content provider domain; 
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, 
tagging the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page 
objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain; 
responsive to a request for the given page received at the content provider 
domain, serving the given page from the content provider domain; and 
serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a given 
content server in the domain instead of from the content provider domain. 
34. A content delivery method, comprising: 
distributing a set of page objects across a network of content servers 
managed by a domain other than a content provider domain, wherein the 
network of content servers are organized into a set of regions; 
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, 
tagging at least some of the embedded objects of the page so that requests 
for the objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider 
domain; 
in response to a client request for an embedded object of the page: 
resolving the client request as a function of a location of the client 
machine making the request and current Internet traffic conditions to 
identify a given region; and 
returning to the client an IP address of a given one of the content servers 
within the given region that is likely to host the embedded object and that 
is not overloaded.249 
The emphasized steps are performed by the customer and are found in the middle 
of each process and provide information to the content delivery provider. The last 
step of each process would be performed by the accused infringer, Limelight, and 
not the end customer. Under the Last Step Rule, then, Limelight would be found to 
                                                           
 248 Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 249 Id. at 1333-34 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (filed Aug. 
22, 2000)). 
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have directly infringed the claims of Akamai’s patent. Accordingly, the end 
customer could be liable for indirect infringement if it could be proven that the 
customer had knowledge of Akamai’s patented process being performed, which was 
not alleged in this case.250 
2. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. 
The patent at issue in McKesson defines a method of electronically 
communicating between a patient and health-care provider.251 The text of the claims 
defining this process reads as follows: 
1. A method of automatically and electronically communicating between 
at least one health-care provider and a plurality of users serviced by the 
health-care provider, said method comprising the steps of: 
initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to the provider 
for information, wherein the provider has established a preexisting 
medical record for each user; 
enabling communication by transporting the communication through a 
provider/patient interface over an electronic communication network to a 
Web site which is unique to the provider, whereupon the communication 
is automatically reformatted and processed or stored on a central server, 
said Web site supported by or in communication with the central server 
through a provider-patient interface service center; 
electronically comparing content of the communication with mapped 
content, which has been previously provided by the provider to the central 
server, to formulate a response as a static or dynamic object, or a 
combined static and dynamic object; and 
returning the response to the communication automatically to the user's 
computer, whereupon the response is read by the user or stored on the 
user's computers 
said provider/patient interface providing a fully automated mechanism for 
generating a personalized page or area within the provider's Web site for 
each user serviced by the provider; and 
said patient-provider interface service center for dynamically assembling 
and delivering custom content to said user.252 
In this process, the accused infringer, Epic Systems, performs the last step.253 The 
patient initiates the process.254 Since Epic Systems performed the last step of 
delivering content to the patient, they would be liable for direct infringement under 
the Last Step Rule. Though the patients in this situation performed the first step, they 
                                                           
 250 See id. at 1306 (majority opinion). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 1335-36 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 (filed June 
29, 2004)) (emphasis added to show step performed by customer). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
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would not be liable for indirect infringement as there was no evidence that they had 
knowledge of the patented process or intended to infringe.255 
E. Effects and Unresolved Issues 
Though the Last Step Rule addresses issues presented by the single-entity rule 
and joint infringement, it may result in subjecting innocent end users of patented 
processes to liability. Additionally, the Last Step Rule does not address the effect of 
process steps being performed outside of the United States. These topics are 
discussed below. 
1. Innocent Last Actors 
Parties who perform steps earlier in the process, thus contributing to the final 
infringement, would not be liable for indirect infringement as long as they were not 
aware that the process was patented.256 This would protect the customer in the case 
of both Akamai I and McKesson if the Last Step Rule were applied to those cases.257 
If an unknowing customer performed the final step in a process, however, the Last 
Step Rule would result in that end user being held liable for direct infringement, as 
direct infringement does not have a knowledge requirement.258 This is a legitimate 
concern, though it is no different than how customers are viewed by the law when 
they assemble a patented product or use a patented system. 
The possibility of an innocent party being caught up in a patent infringement suit 
is reduced by several mitigating factors. Suing an end customer—a potential 
customer of the patentee—will not provide the relief desired by the patentee: an 
injunction and damages against the company who is performing the preceding steps 
of the process. Also, enjoining one single customer would do nothing to prevent 
infringement by other end customers. It is unlikely the plaintiff patentee would 
recover much in the way of damages either.259 Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
plaintiff patentees will even bring such suits against innocent end customers.  
Furthermore, once the patentee makes the direct infringer aware of his or her 
possible infringement, the infringer has many options to consider before trial is 
necessary, such as licensing the patent or switching to a different supplier to avoid 
infringement. If none of these options is viable for the end user, it might be possible 
for him or her to cross-claim against the indirect infringer that induced or contributed 
to the infringement. Discussion of the potential for this type of cross-claim is outside 
of the scope of this Note.260 
                                                           
 255 See id. at 1306 (majority opinion). 
 256 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 257 See supra Parts V.C.1, 2. 
 258 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 259 See Galli & Gecovich, supra note 50, at 685. 
 260 It may be possible to cross claim for breach of the Warranty of Title. U.C.C. § 312(2) 
(“Unless otherwise agreed, a seller that is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind 
warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way 
of infringement.”). 
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2. Steps Performed Outside of the U.S.  
Another argument against the Last Step Rule is that the final step could be 
performed outside of the United States to avoid liability. This is no different, 
however, than the current jurisprudence regarding infringement of process patents 
where one step of the process is performed outside of the jurisdiction of the United 
States.261 Treating processes as accumulating benefits over time under the rationale 
followed by the Last Step Rule does not eliminate this jurisdictional requirement. On 
the other hand, the Last Step Rule does not exacerbate this problem; it is left where it 
is found. 
F. Implementation 
Both the single-entity and the inducement-only rules would be barriers to 
implementation of the Last Step Rule. Both rules were decided by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and could only be overruled by the Supreme Court.  
Following Akamai II, Epic Systems and Limelight Networks petitioned the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari.262 McKesson and Epic have since settled their 
dispute, leaving only Limelight’s petition before the Court.263 Recently, the Supreme 
Court called for the view of the U.S. Solicitor General, possibly indicating that the 
Court is leaning towards granting certiorari and hearing the case.264 
Application of the Last Step Rule would be based on a broad interpretation of 
“uses” in § 271(a), which is supported by both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
precedent.265 As the Last Step Rule is supported by the language of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(a) and could be implemented by the Supreme Court, legislative action would not 
be necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current solutions to the divided infringement problem are inadequate.266 
Furthermore, the recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to 
expand induced infringement creates new problems.267 The Supreme Court should 
take advantage of the opportunity presented by Akamai II to provide a clean solution 
to the divided infringement problem. The Court should overrule the single-entity and 
inducement-only rules and should bring the patent infringement law back into line 
                                                           
 261 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding direct infringement of a method patent requires that every step be performed in the 
United States). 
 262 See Dutra, supra note 219 (noting defendants’ petitions for certiorari have been 
submitted). 
 263 Stewart Bishop, McKesson, Epic End High Court Induced-Infringement Fight, 
LAW360.COM (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/420852/mckesson-epic-end-
high-court-induced-infringement-fight (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
 264 Dennis Crouch, Joint Infringement Case Moves Toward Supreme Court Review, 
PATENTLYO.COM (June 24, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/joint-
infringement-case-moves-toward-supreme-court-review.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
 265 See supra Parts II.B.1, IV.C, V.B.1. 
 266 See supra Parts III, IV. 
 267 See supra Part III.C. 
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with the statutory framework and common law precedent by applying the Last Step 
Rule. Applying the Last Step Rule to process patent infringement cases would treat 
product and process patents similarly and would promote the constitutional policy 
underlying patent law. 
  
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
